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Comment  Amitabh Chandra and Heidi Williams
Many questions in economics are motivated by the question of what circum-
stances or public policies make individuals better or worse oﬀ. Traditionally, 
economists have relied on revealed preference arguments to motivate the 
Amitabh Chandra is an assistant professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School 
of Government, Harvard University, and a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Heidi Williams is a PhD student in economics at Harvard University.
Chandra gratefully acknowledges support from the National Institute on Aging (NIA PO1-
  AG19783); Williams gratefully acknowledges support from the National Institute on Aging, 
Grant Number T32-AG0000186 to the NBER.264    Angus  Deaton
idea that these questions can be answered by studying data on people’s 
observed choices. Dating back at least to the work of Richard Easterlin 
(1974), an alternative and complementary literature has developed that 
focuses on studying data on subjective self-  reports of individuals’ well-
  being—for example, questions that are roughly of the form: “Would you 
say you are very happy, happy but not very happy, unhappy but not very 
unhappy, or very unhappy?”
Building on Easterlin’s seminal work in this area, a large literature has 
developed that uses these types of “happiness” measures to study a variety 
of questions—ranging from whether divorcing couples become happier 
after their marriage dissolves (Gardner and Oswald 2006) to whether the 
narrowing of the gender gap (broadly construed) has led to increases in 
happiness among women (Stevenson and Wolfers, forthcoming). But argu-
ably the main focus of this economics of happiness literature has been on 
the question that Easterlin initially addressed—namely, on studying the 
relationship between income and happiness. In what is thought to be the ﬁ  rst 
analysis of this relationship, Easterlin (1974) noted that although average 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita rose between 1975 and 1997 in the 
United States, mean reported happiness remained relatively ﬂ  at.
In an insightful and thoughtful chapter, Angus Deaton brings fresh per-
spective to the economics of happiness literature. Deaton’s analysis is based 
on the newly available Gallup World Poll data, which covers a large number 
of countries and includes data that is nationally representative for persons 
age ﬁ  fteen and older; the latter feature is arguably an important improve-
ment from previously used data sources, which often only sample urban 
and literate populations. Deaton uses this data to reexamine the Easterlin 
puzzle as well as many of the other classic questions in the economics of 
happiness literature. Importantly, despite noting a powerful association 
between life satisfaction and income, he notes that the association between 
health satisfaction and health (measured as life expectancy and HIV preva-
lence) is tenuous. Deaton concludes that these small correlations between 
subjective measures and real health outcomes should temper our proclivity 
to conclude that subjective well-  being measures are reliable indicators of 
population health.
Are Subjective Well-  Being Measures Useful 
Summary Measures of Social Welfare?
Deaton examines the cross-  country relationship between average life 
satisfaction and life expectancy (table 9.2), and ﬁ  nds that life expectancy 
and changes in life expectancy play limited roles in explaining international 
cross-  sectional variations in average reported life satisfaction. Income dis-
plays a persistent and robust role in predicting life satisfaction, and it does 
not appear to be a statistical surrogate for life expectancy. Deaton notes that 
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little of the variation in reported life satisfaction. When he examines the 
analogous relationship between average health satisfaction (rather than life 
satisfaction) and life expectancy (table 9.3), he ﬁ  nds that life expectancy 
and changes in it play a limited role in explaining international variations 
in average reported health satisfaction.
Deaton correctly notes that these results are at odds with the view that 
subjective health should be at least partially correlated with core measures 
of objective health. His results raise questions about whether subjective 
well-  being measures can serve as useful summary indicators of human wel-
fare in international comparisons. Similar questions were raised by Betsey 
Stevenson and Justin Wolfers (2007), who noted that by many objective mea-
sures of well-  being (for example, real wages, educational attainment, and 
control over fertility) the lives of women in the United States have improved 
dramatically over the past thirty- ﬁ  ve years. Yet measures of subjective well-
 being indicate that women’s happiness has declined over that period both in 
absolute terms and relative to male happiness. The authors document this 
stylized fact in a wide variety of data sets, and show that the trend holds 
across demographic groups—for both working and stay-  at-  home moms, 
for both married and divorced women, for both young and old women, and 
across the education distribution. These ﬁ  ndings raise questions about the 
legitimacy of using subjective well-  being measures to assess the impacts of 
broadscale social changes.
Examining Links between Measures of 
Subjective Well-  Being and “Real” Outcomes
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) review the literature on what subjective 
measures of well-  being are actually measuring and argue that elicitations 
of happiness almost surely provide a measure of true internal utility at the 
individual level. The authors acknowledge that there is clearly some noise 
in measurement, but their interpretation is that the signal-  to-  noise ratio in 
the available data is suﬃciently high to make empirical research productive. 
As evidence, they cite cross-  sectional and panel studies, which suggest that 
unemployed individuals tend to report low happiness scores (Clark and 
Oswald 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998), suggesting that happi-
ness surveys are capturing something meaningful about “true” utility.
Others who have noted the value of subjective measures of health include 
Blanchﬂ  ower and Oswald (2008), who use cross-  country data and provide 
evidence that “happier” countries report systematically lower levels of 
(albeit, self- reported) hypertension, or high blood pressure. As noted by the 
authors, objective hypertension measures would be valuable for this analysis 
but are not available for all countries in their sample. A natural and useful 
extension of this type of analysis would be to ask whether changes in “real” 
health measures aﬀect changes in measures of subjective well-  being. For 
example, one can imagine using micro-  level empirical data to directly test 266    Angus  Deaton
the hypothesis that changes in life expectancy aﬀect measures of subjec-
tive well-  being. Variation in life expectancy may be usefully generated by 
within- person  diﬀerences generated when individuals learn the results of 
medical diagnostic tests—for example, genetic tests that give information on 
an individual’s probability of being diagnosed with breast cancer. Clearly, 
there would be two components to such an exercise—ﬁ  rst to measure the 
short- run response on subjective health, and also to measure the longer- run 
response. This latter reaction may, in theory, be smaller than the former if 
individuals adapt to changes in objective health status over time.
If the results of such micro-  level empirical studies provide evidence that 
changes in health translate into changes in subjective well-  being, one could 
then explore potential explanations that could reconcile these micro-  level 
estimates with the types of macro- level evidence provided by Deaton—which 
suggested little if any relationship between changes in life expectancy and 
measures of subjective well- being. Finding an association in micro- analysis 
that is not present in the macro- analysis could be reconciled through a model 
that included some form of country level diﬀerences in health temperament, 
reference- dependent preferences, or sample- selection. The ﬁ  rst theory would 
suggest that there is an idiosyncratic, country-  speciﬁ  c, “ﬁ  xed eﬀect” in how 
subjective health is reported. The presence of such an eﬀect could, in prin-
cipal, mask a macro relationship between subjective and objective health. 
Of course, if these idiosyncratic diﬀerences in temperament were truly ﬁ  xed, 
the lack of a macro- level association between subjective and objective health 
would reemerge if the regression was estimated in changes (something that 
would be possible with panel data). An alternative theory, as discussed by 
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), is that many researchers—beginning with 
Easterlin himself in his original 1974 article—have suggested that subjective 
well-  being measures may be capturing some form of reference-  dependent 
preferences (which in a cross- section would be statistically indistinguishable 
from country ﬁ  xed eﬀects in temperament). In the context of studying the 
relationship between income and self-  reported measures of subjective well-
  being, several recent studies have suggested that individuals’ self-  reported 
well-  being may depend on their consumption or income relative to some 
reference group (see, for example, Clark [2003] and Luttmer [2005]). Analo-
gously in the context of life expectancy instead of income, if individuals’ 
utility was modeled as a function of their life expectancy relative to the life 
expectancy of some reference group, it is possible that a positive correla-
tion between life expectancy and reported well-  being at the individual level 
could be consistent with there being no or even a negative correlation at the 
aggregate level. A negative correlation between life expectancy and reported 
well-  being at the aggregate level could arise if decreases in life expectancy 
associated (for example) with HIV decreased average life expectancy, but 
the actual individuals aﬀected by HIV who themselves have lower life expec-
tancy are less likely to be captured by surveys than are non-  HIV aﬀected Income, Aging, Health, and Well-Being around the World    2 6 7
individuals. This hypothesis is arguably ruled out by the sampling scheme 
of the Gallup data, which promises representative samples. But to the extent 
to which sicker individuals are less likely to complete these surveys, or are 
more likely to be hospitalized, it is not diﬃcult to see that sample-  selection 
is a third theory that may oﬀer an explanation for the observed facts.
In the absence of additional empirical evidence that changes in objec-
tive measures of well-  being (such as life expectancy) are correlated with 
changes in subjective measures of well-  being, we agree with Deaton that 
it seems diﬃcult to argue that these subjective measures of well-  being can 
serve as useful summary measures of social welfare that can be used to guide 
policy. For example, if one policy was found to raise subjective measures of 
well-  being but leave infant mortality unchanged, and an alternative policy 
was found to reduce infant mortality rates but leave subjective measures of 
well-  being unchanged, one would need to take a stance on which measures 
should be given more weight in a social welfare function. It seems diﬃcult 
to argue that subjective well-  being measures should be valued over “real” 
measures such as infant mortality, at least in the absence of much more 
empirical evidence on these questions.
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